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COMMENTARIES
An Essay on Tort Litigation and the Media
RICHARD W. POWER*
Media, especially television, have become powerful propellants of the law
explosion in the realm of torts. They put in motion forces that have been a
factor in causing the tort system to spiral upward (higher awards) and out-
ward (ever more extensive liability). Whether awards are too high and liabil-
ity too extensive are matters that will not produce a consensus except among
victims of injuries and their lawyers, on one hand, and among liability in-
surers on the other. This essay will explore the role the media have assumed
and its probable effect. The writer will propose that the media have been a
significant factor in infecting the system with excessive awards and unsound
imposition of liability. The result is increasing disruption of the equilibrium
of costs of accidents and costs of prevention and an aggravation of over-
compensation of some victims and undercompensation of others.
The Media Send a Message
Television networks discovered a few years ago that medical news interests
most viewers. Perhaps television reporting, feeding on itself, cultivates even
wider interest. Reporting, both televised and printed, is often focused on a
patient who has received a new kind of treatment. Some medical reporting
involves a patient's malpractice claim; occasionally a reported medical pro-
cedure later blossoms into litigation. Such was the case with the three surviv-
ing Frastici septuplets, whose parents sued their onetime hero, the physician
who prescribed a fertility drug, alleging he failed to warn the plaintiffs of the
increased likelihood of multiple births and attendant risks.' Most televised
news of medicine and tort litigation falls within the category of "soft news,"
which the networks have been criticized for overemphasizing." The effects of
televised reporting of medical and tort reporting are profound.
NBC's "Nightly News" recently reported a new and controversial treat-
ment for eye cataracts,' a practice already in wide use in India. Indicating the
© 1987 Richard W. Power
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1. St. L. Post Dispatch, Oct. 18, 1985, at 7G, col. 1.
2. Washington Post, Aug. 7, 1983, Op. Ed., at C7, deploring what television critic Michael
Arlen called "the institutionalization of soft news."
3. Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 3, 1985).
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hazards faced by Indians, the reporter said there was "no malpractice claim
if something goes wrong"-no doubt an accurate statement of the realities of
the Indian legal system. 4 Still, the implication is that in the United States
there is a malpractice claim if something goes wrong, a premise, at least until
recently, every first year law student recognized as inaccurate. Perhaps there
should be compensation for every failed medical procedure that results in
out-of-pocket loss.- But why stop there? Financial deprivation is not general-
ly the cutoff for responsibility of negligently caused personal injury.
Spicy news stories may crop up, of course, anywhere in the realm of torts.
The more bizarre the facts, the better, as in the widely publicized report that
gave the impression in its headline and opening paragraphs that a woman
had been awarded a million dollars for loss of her claimed psychic powers as
a result of a CAT scan administered by defendant.' Only in the fifth
paragraph of the report was it revealed that the jury had been instructed that
the plaintiff had failed to prove the CAT scan resulted in loss of her psychic
powers.7 To casual newspaper readers, the story left a false impression that a
plaintiff had recovered a large amount on a preposterous claim. The media
apparently believe viewers and readers regard outcomes other than victory
for the plaintiff as anticlimactic. Even when reported, a modest settlement, a
verdict for defendant, a verdict for plaintiff being vacated or reduced, or a
judgment reversed on appeal is usually given much lighter coverage than the
plaintiff's complaint or original victory.
A feature of much reporting is that it fails to identify the basis for impos-
ing liability. The public is led to believe that the occurrence of an accident is
sufficient for Hability of one involved in the accident. In some jurisdictions,
the law may be moving toward the premise that one who suffers injury is en-
titled to compensation from anyone causally involved in the transaction
resulting in injury regardless of the improbability that his involvement in-
creased the likelihood of injury. Frequently in recent years, reports in the
media of product liability cases have fostered the assumption that the injured
party need not show the product was defective; for example, a drug
manufacturer is strictly liable for harm caused the user of its product even
though the drug the plaintiff consumed conformed to specifications, the
manufacturer followed proper testing procedures and warned users of possi-
ble detrimental effects. The public's belief is a force moving the law to in-
creasingly extensive liability. Product liability and malpractice cases are
4. Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why. So Little Has Happened in India after the Bhopal
Tragedy, 20 Tax. INrL L.J. 273 (1985).
5. See O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantee of
Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 798 (1985).
6. Says Her Powers Vanished; "Psychic" Awarded $988,000 in Hospital CAT-Scan
Lawsuit, L.A. Times, Mar. 30, 1986, pt. 1, at 20, col. 1; Gets $1 Million For Suffering; Woman
Claims CAT Scan Ended Her Psychic Powers, L.A. Times, Mar. 19, 1986, pt. 1, at 3, col. 1.
7. Four months later when the judge set aside the verdict as grossly excessive, the headlines
did not indicate the failure of proof. Claimed CAT Scan Stole Her Powers; Judge Overrules




following a course similar to Federal Employees Liability Act cases in the
1950s and 1960s, during which they evolved so as to impose something ap-
proaching strict liability on the railroad employer.8 Such a development con-
forms to Professor Lawrence Friedman's two. superprinciples of "total
justice"'-the public's general expectation of justice and general expectation
of recompense for loss.'" Professor Friedman does not, of course, accept
unequivocally the propriety of expectations of recompense."
The frequent failure of the media to identify the basis of liability, though
conforming to a norm of flashy, superficial reporting, abets the casino at-
mosphere of tort litigation. A report in the media of an injured person's
recovery often satisfies a need of the public for a champion with whom they
can, if not identify, empathize. There is a David and Goliath appeal to a
story of recovery by an injured person against a large corporation. Occa-
sionally there are reports of recoveries which few viewers and readers would
applaud, such as that of a man who got more than $265,000 from a school
district when he fell through a glass skylight on a school roof one night while
attempting to steal some of the school's lighting fixtures, or that of a man
who collected $650,000 in an out-of-court settlement from the New York Ci-
ty Transit Authority when struck by a train as he jumped onto the tracks in a
suicide attempt."2 Few readers would favor a plaintiff who reportedly sued a
distillery and a brewery claiming damages for defendants' failure to warn
him on their products' labels that alcohol is addictive. 3 Nor would most
readers likely favor that plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief to the effect
that alcoholic beverage manufacturers should put such warnings on their pro-
ducts,' though they might well favor a warning that overindulgence leads to
drunkenness and accidents. Sometimes the public's views of a particular rul-
ing may not be apparent, and sometimes opinion may be sharply divided, as
is likely with plaintiffs' thus far unsuccessful claims against cigarette
manufacturers for causing lung cancer. But media coverage of controversial
and even unappealing cases makes the reading and viewing public more
litigation conscious. "If he can sue for that, I can sue for this," must be a
common thought."
8. See MALONE, PLANT & LrrrLE, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 25-26 (1974).
9. L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUsTICE (1985).
10. Id. at 43, 75-76.
11. Id.
12. Sorry, Your Policy is Canceled, TimE, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16, 20, 23.
13. Wail St. J., Aug. 28, 1986, at 38, col. 4.
14. Today (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 17, 1986).
15. Kelley & Beyler, Large Damage Awards and the Insurance Crisis: Causes, Effects and
Cures, 75 ILL. B.J. 140, 151 (1986) [hereinafter Kelley & Beyler]:
[P]ublicity over million-dollar verdicts might stir up more claims. The media
reports may convince some people who have suffered similar injuries that they also
have winning claims. Others may conclude that tort suits are a way to hit the
jackpot....
[P]rofessional advertising by lawyers probably also stirs up more claims. Televi-
sion, radio, and newspaper ads educate injured persons about their rights. As the
19871
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A characteristic of television reporting is frequent repetition of a capsule
statement of an event without elaboration. Reporting of court decisions is a
good example: who wins, who loses, and how much, if anything, is all the
public is told. As Professor Scoles observed, "[Tihe all-consuming effort of
the media, the public, and the [legal] profession to quantify everything fre-
quently overshadows attention and concern for substantive quality."' 6 Con-
scientious national newspapers, news magazines, and television specials are
generally exceptions to capsule reporting, but even when "60 Minutes" ex-
amines medical malpractice, there is often no attempt to explain the basis of
a physician's liability, and the reporting frequently seems shamefully biased,
calculated to produce outrage in the viewer. Is that why "60 Minutes" is
television's most popular program? In-depth television coverage commonly
fails to give a balanced view.' While media typically present a view favorable
to plaintiffs, an. example of the opposite polarity was PBS's "Louis Rukeyser
Looks At American Business,"'" in the course of which a panel of distin-
guished busineis executives deplored the shadow of product liability that
plagues the economy with large and unwarranted recoveries. Never was there
recognition that some plaintiffs have suffered serious or catastrophic injury
and have meritorious claims for large sums.
Televised news and commentary are not the only force television exerts on
tort cases. Ihe televised hospital drama is now as stereotyped as western
movies had become by the beginning of World War II. Skilled, humane
physicians, the white hats, administer the life-giving treatments, overcoming
what seem insurnountable obstacles to the patient's recovery. In the public's
mind these fictional doctors tend in time to furnish a norm with which real
physicians' work is to be judged, both in and out of the courtroom. Occa-
sionally, of course, the scriptwriters throw in a bad egg physician who is
eventually exposed for the bungler he is, with appropriate retribution, or
even an ill-founded malpractice claim against a white hat physician in
which justice finally prevails. Skewed and misleading as televised hospital
drama and media news reports may be, and much as one would welcome im-
provement in the media's performance, experience teaches that media re-
spond to profits and not to criticism. Freedom of expression, as anyone
knows, consitutionally insulates the media from control, nor should it be
otherwise.
ads become more effective, more persons will see a lawyer and more persons will
sue.
16. Scoles, How Has Law Teaching Changed in Past 25 Years?, 16 SYLLABUs 1, 7 (1985).
17. For example, Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 2, 1987), reported on Delta
Airlines' insurer's investigation into the habits and life-styles of victims of the crash in Dallas on
August 2, 1985. The viewer was left with the strong impression that the insurer had acted im-
properly in its investigative techniques, despite the unemphasized statement of Professor Gary
Schwartz of the University of California at Los Angeles to the contrary. The same anti-insurer,
antidefendant tilt -*as evident in a report by 60 Minutes on the Delta crash investigation. (CBS
television broadcast, Feb. 15, 1987).




While lawyers have frequented television drama less than doctors, televi-
sion drama is a significant factor in shaping public attitudes toward lawyers.
On the whole, lawyers bear a less positive image. Still, the televised image of
the lawyer, sometimes a virtuous genius, sometimes an unscrupulous fixer,
usually forceful, serves to make the public more litigation conscious. The
currently popular "L.A. Law," perhaps inspired in part by the success of
"St. Elsewhere," dealing with the vicissitudes of professional life in a Boston
hospital, offers the viewing public a perception of lawyers' ingenuity,
machinations, and infighting in a large, prestigious firm. The show probably
exaggerates most lawyers' propensity to litigate and to threaten litigation.
The stakes, financially and otherwise, are always high. "People's Court,"
recently rated fifth in popularity of all television shows, alerts the public to
the possibility of litigation and probably reinforces Friedman's principles of
total justice even when the viewer disagrees with the outcome. Though
lawyers are not involved, the robed judge (a retired judge of the Los Angeles
Superior Court), projects a positive, authoritative, friendly but firm image."
The success of "People's Court" has spawned "Superior Court" and
"Divorce Court." Also, a recent series of Perry Mason movies made for
television was well received.
Television quiz-show giveaways, until recently confined to a largely female
daytime audience, have moved to prime time or near it. Shows such as
"Wheel of Fortune" accustom a large audience to sudden riches for a con-
stant stream of contestants, microscopic as those lucky, quick-witted people
may be as a percent of the population. Even advertising on television, with
its frenzied or laid-back pitch for a product, may engender in the minds of
the public the belief that every problem must have a remedy. Nowhere is this
more evident than in the advertisements of that newcomer to television
advertising, the attorney.
Big Bucks
Cases involving permanent and severe personal injury cannot but be emo-
tionally charged. The defendant, either by a fluke of fate connected with his
nonwrongful, ordinary activity, or by creating a risk in the course of lawful
activity, by inadvertence, or by evil design, or by something in between, has
destroyed something of the plaintiff's-his bodily or psychic integrity. How
is he to accept "a diminished thing"? 0 The opposite ends of the broad spec-
19. In some cities, small claims filing have risen 30% to 50% since Judge Joseph
Wapner opened session on the TV show in 1981.... On numerous occasions peo-
ple say, "That's not the way Judge Wapner does it," says William Bristol, a city
court judge in Rochester, N.Y.... Judges worry that the TV program primes
people for battle, not settlement. Its announcer ends each show by saying: "Don't
take the law into your own hands-take your case to court.
Clear Verdict: The People's Court Spurs Surge in Small-Claims Cases, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1987,
at 31, col. 3.
20. "The question that he frames in all but words/Is what to make of a diminished thing."
1987]
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trum of circumstance in which tort claims arise evoke antipodal responses:
the incompetent surgeon or drunk driver who inflicts grievous injury on an
innocent victim is at the other end from the plaintiff who claims damages for
injuries which, while unpleasant and not feigned, are trivial when compared
with serious and permanent physical injury. Cases involving plaintiff's arrest
for erroneously suspected shoplifting in defendant's store are a good ex-
ample. The case is extreme when the claim is against a defendant who did
nothing wrong or who merely made a mistake that in the vicissitudes of living
might be made by anyone, not the egregious error of the chronic bungler.
Even a well-founded claim takes on a different aura if the amount of
damages claimed is beyond reason. While the plaintiff has thereby injected a
shock element, perhaps an understandable strategy for plaintiffs, enormous
claims may rightly be viewed as tainted by greed. ABC's "World News
Tonight" reported that three billion dollars in claims have been filed against
Lederle Laboratories, 21 makers of polio vaccine; a 7-year-old child who will
be severely crippled for life filed suit for $75 million. The child idiosyn-
cratically (one chance in a million) contracted polio from the vaccine, a risk
that has been known for many years.22 The magnitude of the claim seems
ludicrous and not functional. How much happier, if at all, would the plain-
tiff's life be: by having an income of $3 million a year rather than $100,000 a
year? Surely this misfortune cries out for compensation, for risk sharing, but
by a compensation system patterned on accident insurance benefits or
workers' compensation and funded ultimately by all those who benefit from
the use of polio vaccine.
23
How many awards of $75 million or anything approaching it can our
economy afford? A 22-year-old man made paraplegic in an oil field accident
was awarded more than $64 million by a Texas federal court jury. 4 A
68-year-old man who claimed his legs had to be amputated as a result of tak-
ing defendant's medication, Coumadin, was awarded $39 million by a state
court jury in Chicago. 2s Both cases are being appealed. The Wall Street Jour-
nal reported that jurors said they returned larger verdicts than were war-
ranted because they knew that amounts were often cut down by the judge or
Frost, The Oven Bird Song, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST (1969). The poem is set out in
Engel, The Oven Bird's Song, 18 L. & Soc. REv. 551 (1984).
21. Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community, World News
Tonight (ABC television broadcast, May 11, 1986).
22. EPSTEIN, K-ALvEN & GRE-ORY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 698 [hereinafter EPSTmNI
(4th ed. 1984).
23. See O'Conmell, Transferring Injured Victims' Tort Rights to No-Fault Insurers: New
"Sole Remedy" Approaches to Cure Liability Insurance Ills, 1977 U. ILL. L. REV. 749. In
September 1986, North Carolina limited vaccine liability to $300,000 plus state welfare. Com-
pensation is to be administered by the Industrial Commission, which administers workers' com-
pensation. "The legislature hopes that the price of vaccines, up to 90% of which is for in-
surance, will come way down." Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1986, at 28, col. 1.





on appeal. 26 Is this a contemporary application of the ancient notion that the
function of the jury is to correct the law? Even more extreme was the case of
a worker exposed to toxic chemicals who later died of leukemia; a Texas jury
awarded the plaintiffs $107.8 million. 27 How could these plaintiffs possibly
spend such amounts during their lifetimes? What societal benefit flows from
making these horribly unfortunate people, or anyone, super-rich? Should not
more of available resources be channeled to deserving yet undercompensated
accident and illness victims?
The heirs of Leon Klinghoffer, the victim of the Achille Lauro highjack-
ing, were reported on network television to be suing both the PLO and
Chandris Lines, the cruise operator, for $1.5 billion. 28 Legally strong and
morally appealing as their claim for compensation is, what principle and
monetary need could not be vindicated by suing for a thousandth of that? Is
not the integrity of the claim, its potential to vindicate a principle, com-
promised by its enormity? Human life and good health are beyond price;
surely no premise is worn smoother with use.
As amounts claimed and recovered increase year by year, 29 the public, in-
fused with the media's reporting, becomes ever more accustomed and recep-
26. Generous Juries, May 29, 1986, Wall St. J., at 1, col. 1.
27. Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1987, at 20, col. I.
28. N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1985, at B7, col. 4.
29. Generous Juries, Wall St. J., May 29, 1986, at 1, col. 1. Kelley & Beyler, supra note 15,
state:
Multiplying the average award by the frequency of awards yields the total that
insurers will pay. But multiplying the median award by the frequency of awards
does not. Thus, high averages can kill, but high medians by themselves
cannot....
Once inflation has been factored out, the median award in medical malpractice
and products liability cases has remained approximately constant in recent years.
On that ground, the insurers' critics sometimes argue that nothing important has
happened.
This argument misuses the median statistic. It implies the insurers' payments re-
main constant whenever the median award remains constant. Due to skyrocketing
awards at the top end, however, the average award has gone through the roof.
Since the average award determines what insurers will pay, something very impor-
tant has happened despite the constant median.
Id. at 148.
The RAND STUDY (1982) found that between 1960 and 1979 the average jury awards in all types
of tort cases in Cook County, Illinois, "doubled even after factoring out inflation." Id. The
average malpractice award increased "550 percent from $32,000 for 1960-64 to $207,000 for
1975-79 in constant 1979 dollars." Id. Jury Verdict Research, Current Award Trends, in 1 Pn-
SONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS (1986)), found that "the average medical malpractice
award nationwide increased from $220,018 to $666,123, representing a real increase of 59 per-
cent." The average product liability verdict "jumped from $393,590 in 1975 to $1,021,956 in
1984 for a 'real dollar' increase of 35 percent. Again, this increase is significant, but not quite as
high as the Cook County increase." Id. at 149.
Further, Kelley and Beyler find enormous disparity in the size of verdicts depending upon
whether the defendant is an individual, a corporation, or a governmental agency.
The Rand "deep pockets" study proves, however, that damage awards depend to
an unconscionable extept on who has inflicted the harm. Whether the defendant is
1987]
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tive to high claims and awards, just as the public is desensitized to the
magnitude of government expenditures and the national debt. It was big
news when a Texas state court jury awarded the plaintiff $11 billion in Penn-
zoil v. Texaco.3 The next victim of an outrage, or his attorney, may feel
driven to sue for two billion or ten billion in order to make his claim
newsworthy amd shocking. A person called for jury duty is probably condi-
tioned by the media to hearing about claims for enormous sums, and may for
this reason be overly generous to a plaintiff even if the plaintiffs claim is
meritorious. The Wall Street Journal reported that jurors in a suit for a large
amount against a large corporation, no doubt influenced, among other ways,
by plaintiff's attorney's advocacy, declared they had to think in terms of
millions of dollars because the defendant corporation was accustomed to
dealing with large amounts.3 '
Beatiful People: Enhancing Image and Ego by Lawsuits
Celebrity plaintiffs often sue for large amounts for defamation or some
other psychic harm. One suspects that publicity is the motivation of many
such suits wbich, for good reason, the plaintiff does not expect to lead to a
significant settlement, much less to bring to trial. Frequently the plaintiff
succeeds irt getting publicity, which needlessly injures the tort system, flawed
.as it is for other reasons. Typical of publicity-grabbing claims that cumulate
to taint the judicial system is one filed early in 1986 by Lana Turner and her
-daughter Cheryl Crane against TV Guide and one of its authors for more
than $100 million, claiming that the magazine falsely reported that Crane had
been convicted of murder in 1958. According to plaintiffs, Crane had been
absolved of blame in the victim's death. Plaintiffs each claimed $500,000 in
general and $50 million in punitive damages.
32
An ill-founded claim or even a meritorious one for an amount far in excess
-of reason is not only an abuse of the judicial system but debases it in the
public's view. The public comes to think that a court is no different from a
casino where anyone can come in and play for high stakes, with the signifi-
cant difference that if he loses, he is not out much.
One need but look to the Continent for cures. In the United States, the
risks of lo,;ing are too low, both for plaintiffs and defendants. A graduated
schedule of filing fees scaled to the magnitude of the claim is one way of in-
an "individual" or a "government" should not affect a compensatory damage
award. But this difference in labels will treble or slash it to one-third its size.
Whether defendant is an "individual" or "corporation" should be equally irrele-
vant. :But this difference counts for even more.
Id. at 156.
30. District Court for 151st Judicial District of Texas (1985) (unreported). Although reduc-
ing punitive darsrages from $3 billion to $1 billion, the judgment was otherwise affirmed. Texaco
v. Pennzoil, No. 01-86-0216-CV (Tex. Ct. App. 1st Dist. Feb. 12, 1987).
31. Generous Juries, May 29, 1986, Wall St. J., at 1, col. 1.




creasing the risk. Plaintiffs claiming huge damages should bear in substantial
measure the costs their suits generate for the system. If such a plaintiff
prevails, making a substantial recovery, the filing fee could be shifted to the
defendant as a cost. By filing an action a plaintiff would be compelled to put
his money where his mouth is. Frivolous suits for large sums would become
expensive, as they should be, and so would a defendant's continued dilatory
resistance of a meritorious claim for a large amount.3 3 A hefty filing fee, say
$10,000 for a suit claiming millions in damages, would inhibit capricious
lawsuits while not inhibiting a meritorious claim for a vast sum. A poor per-
son with such a claim could petition for a waiver of the filing fee upon mak-
ing an appropriate showing. Another corrective, and one that promotes
settlements, is to adopt as the norm, tempered by judicial discretion, the
European practice of charging the losing party with the prevailing party's at-
torney fees."' A salutary corollary is that a plaintiff who recovers only a
small fraction of his claim-say about 20 percent-is deemed the loser.
While plaintiffs Turner and Crane may be entitled to something, their
claimed misfortunes seem trivial when compared to the misfortunes of those
who have suffered severe personal injury. Much of the public is probably not
aware that a well-known plaintiff expects to recover little or nothing and is
using a lawsuit for free publicity or as a prop for a large ego. Still, not all
celebrity plaintiffs are publicity seekers or those with insubstantial grievances
seeking to indulge their neuroses, notwithstanding Katharine Hepburn's
marvelous pinprick that bursts the huge balloon of defamation: "I don't care
what they say about me as long as it isn't true." While there was doubtless a
large element of vanity in her suit, the late Lillian Hellman probably felt gen-
uinely aggrieved by allegedly defamatory remarks made by Mary McCarthy
on the Dick Cavett show;3" two literary Amazons are perhaps natural
enemies. Most persons no doubt applauded Carol Burnett's well-publicized
moment of victory when a jury returned a verdict of $1 million against the
National Enquirer for libel. 6 It appeared that plaintiff Burnett did nothing
to precipitate the defendant's defamatory statements, as many celebrity
plaintiffs do, and that hers was a case of a claim for a large sum wholly
motivated by a desire to vindicate a principle.
3 7
33. See, e.g., The 'American Rule' Has Outlived Its Usefulness; Adopt the 'English Rule',
Nat'l L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 13, urging adoption of the English rule. In Marek v. Chesny, 105 S.
Ct. 3012 (1985), the Court took a step in this direction in holding that a party who unreasonably
rejects settlement offers is liable for attorney fees thereby incurred by the opposing party.
34. A recent Indiana rule enables a judge to charge frivolous litigators with their opponents'
attorney fees. IND. R. App. P. 15(G).
35. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1984, at C4, col. 4. Miss McCarthy said that, "Everything [Miss
Hellman] writes is a lie, including and and the." N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1986, at G1, col. 2.
36. The trial judge reduced the recovery, which was further reduced on appeal to $50,000
compensatory and $150,000 punitive damages. The recovery was reportedly donated to charity.
Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983).
3 7 Most [defamation] plaintiffs lost in court. Even for those who won, the terms of
judicial victory were disappointing....
1987]
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The Uniquely American Malaise
No country's compensation system approaches perfection. Insofar as com-
pensation for injury in the United States depends on tort law, the system and
many of ifs problems are unique. Only in the United States are damages for
personal injury assessed by a jury. Outside the United States the media give
little attention to compensation for injuries, probably because victims of ac-
cidents never recover vast sums. (In Great Britain the popular press does
delight in covering defamation litigation involving a celebrity; on the Conti-
nent defamation is assimilated into criminal law.) Only in the United States is
coverage by the media of injury litigation an important factor in whether
plaintiffs recover and how much. I do not refer, of course, to coverage of the
accident involved in this jury trial, but to the preconditioning of attitudes of
plaintiffs and jurors by the media's typical attentions to tort litigation.
To a much greater extent than in other countries our system overcompen-
sates and undercompensates. Its unfairness to victims by reason of ineffi-
ciency and delay is, however, a shortcoming surpassed by the handling of
tort claims in Italy, for example. There, as everywhere else in the world,
compensation for personal injury is minimal by American standards of tort
law, unpredictable and wide-ranging as they may be. Delays in Italy are
typically much longer than those even in metropolitan areas of the United
States. In Italy, compensation for pain and suffering is in its infancy.3" Since
courts are not viewed as instruments for effectuating social change and
redistribution of wealth, many losses, apart from those involving auto ac-
cidents, that are shifted in the United States are borne by the victim in Italy.
If an accident results in disability, the victim is entitled to a small government
pension.
A virtually nonfunctioning tort system is that of India, a system which
may, however, be brought to life by the Bhopal claims. Marx said wars are
the locomotives of history; public catastrophes may be the locomotives of
compensation systems. At least the right to recover in India exists in theory,
while in most of the Third World tort law does not exist except as it operates
within the criminal law system, the criminal defendant's fate typically depen-
dent upon a satisfactory settlement with the victim.
The uniqueness and shortcomings of the American system are elegantly ex-
pressed by Professor Ernest Weinrib of the University of Toronto:
IThe principal object of the lawsuit for most plaintiffs is not to obtain
monetary relief for financial harm. Instead, the major motivating factors are
restoring reputation, correcting what plaintiffs view as falsity, and vengeance.
[Ulltinate judicial victory should not be the primary criterion for judging suc-
cess, since the plaintiffs' motives in filing suit may often make that criterion
largely irrelevant. Instead, plaintiffs view the lawsuit as an instrument for self-
help, regardless of its judicial outcome.
Bezanson, Th Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs Get, 74
CALIF. L. l.v. 789, 791-92 (1986).




In... common-law jurisdictions [other than the United States]
tort law embodies corrective justice. Its focus is the moral relation
between defendant and plaintiff as doer and victim of a single
harm. This requires that the defendant be treated as an equal in
the relationship .... The law works justice between the parties at
the cost of a narrower ambit of recovery than parallel American
law.
This more restrictive tort system is, however, encased in a more
generous and elaborate network of social welfare and insurance
benefits.... ITihe judicial elaboration of tort law is insulated
from the broader social policy pressures of accident and illness.
In contrast, tort law in the United States is less informed by the
notion of doing justice between the parties....
All the institutional pressures thus conspire to enlarge the range
and amount of tort recovery and to throw up an expansive
framework of recovery that includes strict product liability,
punitive damages and the manipulation of tort doctrines and pro-
cedures to accommodate unmanageably complex claims. The in-
adequate network of distributive justice allows the courts to
assume political and managerial functions in the inappropriate
context of private law litigation.
39
Professor Weinrib concludes the United States system is in effect an ar-
bitrarily imposed tax without representation of those who bear the tax.
Shortcomings of the American system have been identified and remedies
prescribed, if not more than a half century ago, at least in the 1960s by the
second generation of writers of no-fault compensation schemes for the auto
accident victim. 40 For decades criticisms did not fall on fertile ground. With
the exception of no-fault auto accident legislation in several states,4' and
widespread adoption of comparative negligence statutes,42 legislatures have
39. Letter to the N.Y. Times, May 16, 1986, at A34, col. 3. A more prosaic statement is that
of Besharov and Reuter:
[T]ort liability in the U.S. is greater than it is in other countries for five reasons:
(1) U.S. substantive rules (such as strict liability in manufacturing); (2) U.S. pro-
cedural rules (such as those concerning discovery and class actions) facilitate litiga-
tion against defendants; (3) U.S. measures of damages (such as those for pain and
suffering and punitive damages) increase manyfold the amount of a potential judg-
ment; (4) U.S. juries value human life and suffering more highly than do [courts]
in other countries; and (5) contingent-fee arrangements, illegal everywhere else in
the world, allow plaintiffs' lawyers to advance the costs of litigation.
Besharov & Reuter, Tort Laws Hobble U.S. Business Abroad, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 22,
col. 3.
40. See, e.g., Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MicH. L. REv.
279 (1964).
41. 3 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, TORTS, § 13.8 (2d ed. 1986).
42. 4 id. § 22.1 n.6.
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only recently responded. The effect and constitutionality of much remedial
legislation is still in doubt.'
3
Influence! of the media, unlike criticism for academics, is a relatively new
phenomenon. Only within the last decade have the media significantly in-
fluenced the compensation system. While we have no definitive, quantified
answers as to the extend of their impact, and probably never will, one may
still be persuaded that the media impress upon us the aberrational as the
norm. The aberrational then gradually affects the norm, feeding the run-of-
the-mine tort plaintiff's expectations of excessive recovery and of recovery
when there should be none. Most jurors have been influenced, consciously or
otherwise, by the media, just as the plaintiff has. The impact of media in re-
cent years is not merely an instance of the common law's adaptation to social
change." Rather, media, principally television because it commands a vastly
higher potential than the printed word for shaping public attitudes, have ef-
fected a rise in unrealizable expectations of the public. "Historic continuity
with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity," Holmes said."
Propelled by television, which tends to integrate attitudes nationally, claim
consciousness seems to be spreading from the metropolis to smaller com-
munities. Lawyers' recently acquired freedom from some restraints on adver-
tising may well generate personal injury clients outside metropolitan areas as
well as within, and may be particularly significant in class actions for product
liability.
An unfavorable attitude toward litigation, however, may still prevail. In a
study in the late 1970s of a small county in Illinois, tort litigation was rare.
Personal injury victims did not often press negligence claims. A woman who
was severely burned when coffee was spilled on her during a commercial
flight accepted the airline's initial offer of medical expenses and the cost of a
missed week's vacation. She disfavored a lawsuit saying, "We don't do
that."'  Another woman suffering permanent injuries because of a
neighbor's negligently maintained premises, and whose brother was a lawyer,
received less than her medical expenses from the neighbor's insurance but did
not attempt to recover any more. Her husband said, "We were thankful that
she recovered as well as she did .... We never considered a lawsuit there at
all."' 7 But examples of attitudes of seven or eight years ago may well be an-
cient history by now.
43. EPSTEIN, .upra note 22, at 776.
44. Cf. Davidson, Drastic Change is Dangerous, 72 A.B.A. J. 36 (1986):
The genius of the common law, evolved over generations, has been its ability to
grow and adapt to society's changing morality and needs. At issue is what reform
[of tort law] is warranted and how it should be achieved. Urging sudden and
drastic changes in substantive law and procedure challenges the validity not only of
tort law but of the process by which it has been developed and applied.
45. 0. HOLMEs, LEARNING AND SCIENCE, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs 139 (1920).
46. Engle, supra note 20, at 561.





The latest shock waves that have rippled through the compensation system
have not centered around automobile accident victims, 48 though, of course,
they continue to represent the largest volume of claims even with vastly in-
creased volume of product liability and malpractice claims, types of claims
that have attracted much attention from the media.49 The automobile acci-
dent victim was the prime concern of academic lawyers from 1930 until in-
terest in no-fault auto liability schemes waned a half century later. Forces
against no-fault succeeded in preventing its further adoption in recent years
following a wave of no-fault legislation beginning in Massachusetts in 1971.10
Some legislatures enacted schemes incompatible with economically sound
functioning of a no-fault system by preserving a common law tort action
even for relatively minor accidents while entitling the party at fault to com-
pensation for his injuries.
That scholarly interest has tended to shift from the automobile accident
victim was evident in the California Law Review of May 1985, a symposium
issue devoted to compensation systems and tort theory. There is consensus
among contributors on one premise: the current system of redressing civil
wrongs does not satisfy anyone except the plaintiffs' bar. But the infinite
ranges of questions of how the system should be modified continue to pro-
duce violent and basic disagreements. The reader feels that while the
discourse has been refined over the decades, the system is hardly closer to, in-
deed it may be farther from, a reasonably fair and efficient system than it
was a generation ago. While some severities and imbalances have been rec-
tified, such as the bar of contributory negligence, new ones have arisen, for
example, the trial as consummate stagecraft,"' comparative negligence coupl-
ed with joint and several liability, and dilution of the requirement of causa-
tion in fact.s
2
There are others to blame in addition to the plaintiffs' bar. While we may
wish that the media would do better reporting on compensation matters and
conscientiously assess the force they exert in publicizing the problems of the
compensation system, freedom of expression is the overarching principle.
The media cannot be blamed in the sense that legislatures can often be
blamed for yielding to pressures from the plaintiffs' bar or insurance com-
panies. Nor has the plaintiffs' bar been remiss in attempting to coopt the
media broadcast of its righteous message that some groups, notably insurers,
health care providers, and manufacturers, want to limit recoveries and to
take away the right "the law" accords to sue for injuries and to have
damages determined by a jury. For example, Robert Havel, president of the
48. Kelley & Beyler, supra note 15, at 148.
49. Id. at 146-47.
50. See generally EPSTiN, supra note 22, at 965-85.
51. See Eisenberg, A Doctor on Trial, N.Y. Times Magazine, July 20, 1986, at 26.
52. See Jacob, Of Causation in Science and Law, 40 Bus. LAw. 1229 (1985).
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Association. of Trial Lawyers of America said, "What strikes me about these
proposals [for pending federal product liability legislation limiting the
amount of recovery] is the total lack of compassion for terribly injured peo-
ple."" The Wall Street Journal editorialized wryly, "He was referring to
clients, not lawyers.""' Recently manufacturers and liability insurance com-
panies have sought to counter the efforts of the plaintiffs' bar by adver-
tisements and inclusion of material in reports to shareholders and
policyholders."
It would be nice if there was no substance to the strictures of the plaintiff's
bar. Unfortunately, some plaintiffs, be they saintly and conciliatory or
greedy and litigious, are the victims of careless or outrageous conduct of
defendants and deserve high compensation for serious injury. The plaintiffs'
bar justifies contingent fees as enabling plaintiffs to sue who could not pay
an attorney's fee up front, a justification clouded by the typical absence of
an option to pay a retainer and hourly fee and by the fact that contingent
fees are considered unethical almost everywhere except in the United States."
Under a contingent fee arrangement plaintiffs' attorneys not infrequently
have many thousands of dollars invested in a lawsuit without any assurance
of reimbursement. To a large extent this situation is a monster of the at-
torneys' own making, raising the ante in a game where the chances of win-
ning have improved, and as a consequence compelling the defense to incur
heavier expense in preparation as well. A further effect is to concentrate the
53. Wall St. J., May 1, 1986, at 26, col. 1.
The entire tort system is under constant attack. It is imperative that we develop a
long-range plan to deal with the attack, rather than react to each individual crisis
as it arises. And that is just what the New York State Trial Lawyers Association
has been and is doing. BUT WE CANNOT DO IT WITHOUT YOU. YOU MUST
GET P]-RSONALLY INVOLVED!
YOU must carry forth the message that there is a societal benefit to a system
which provides full and reasonable compensation for an innocent person from a
responsible wrongdoer, and which system also serves as a deterrent to careless con-
duct.
Fred Queller, President's Message, 17 TRLAL LAW. Q. (No. 1 1985).
54. Wall St. J., May 1, 1986, at 26, col. 1.
55. The following excerpt from the second quarter 1986 report of Pfizer, a drug manufac-
turer, is typical:
A CRISIS IN THE TORT LAW SYSTEM PLACES AMERICANS AT RISK
The need for reform in the U.S. tort system, the legal framework for compen-
sating personal injury, has been well documented in the media. Seldom does a day
go by without a report of yet another extreme court or jury award to someone who
has brought suit.
However striking, these awards divert attention from the real issue-the U.S.
Court system has gone seriously awry, driving up the price of insurance and mak-
ing it impossible to obtain in some cases.
The tort law crisis has cut the standard of living for Americans. A continuing
crisis could damage U.S. industrial competitiveness, thus costing American jobs.
56. Comment, Of Ethics and Economics: Contingent Percentage Fees for Legal Services, 16
AKRON L. REv. 747, 748 (1983); Comment, Contingent Percentage Fees: An Economic Analysis,




most lucrative injury cases among established, prosperous attorneys who can
advance large sums for long periods. Such expenses constitute money that
will not go to an injured person nor can they be justified as significantly ad-
vancing fairness in the disposition of the case, the development of legal rules,
or scientific knowledge. However great an attorney's skill, patience, and ef-
forts, an attorney's fee in the millions, one-third of a plaintiff's multimillion-
dollar recovery, is scandalous.
Contingency fees applying customarily high percentages to ever increasing
recoveries have resulted in legislation in many states and proposed federal
legislation in product liability cases putting a cap on fees and instituting a
downward sliding scale as the amount recovered increases. To believe that an
attorney's efforts will slacken if, for example, his percentage of the recovery
drops to 10 percent of amounts over $500,000 is to make a cynical assessment
of professional responsibility; plaintiffs' lawyers would continue to be ade-
quately compensated. Furthermore, tempering the jackpot mentality is a
needed correction, as is eliminating "overkill" in preparation for trial in big
cases. Surely a sliding scale is as appropriate in personal injury litigation as it
is and always has been in settlement of estates. It is commonly believed that
successful personal injury plaintiffs' lawyers earn more than partners in
prestigious New York law firms (who may also be overcompensated).
Public Expectations and Unprovable Reality
Professor Friedman finds a "superprinciple" in the public's general ex-
pectation of recompense for loss. The emergence of such expectation is sug-
gested to him by the cases of a plaintiff who was stood up on a date and of a
plaintiff who sued his parents for lack of care in rearing him, thereby turning
him into a nervous wreck. 8 While obviously without merit, such suits have
changed from being unthinkable a century ago to thinkable ("somebody
thought of them, after all"). 5 9 Instead of claim-consciousness gone mad and
threatening the existing compensation system, flawed as it is, in Friedman's
view such frivolous suits are but extreme instances of a recently evolved
general expectation of justice-amusing, harmless overkill arising from a
commendable public expectation. "If someone senses a wrong, she feels that
there must be a remedy somewhere in the system."' 0 "People file lawsuits
because they have confidence in the legal system. It's something to be proud
of."
16
57. O'Connell, supra note 5, at 803.
58. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 76.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Stewart, Seeking Justice, Wall St. J., May 20, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (quoting Professor Fried-
man). Cf. Willard, Restore Balance to the Tort System, 72 A.B.A. J. (July 1, 1986), at 36
"Stories of wacky lawsuits and outrageous jury awards are common. Public confidence in the
fairness of our courts in civil cases is at an all-time low."
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At least until recently, the great majority of individual plaintiffs who have
recovered a million dollars or more have deserved it. Who would not rather
have health and an unmaimed body than ten million dollars? Even now a
large recovery is statistically rare, but with the cumulation of reports by the
media of such recoveries, the number of which has increased substantially
each year, the large recovery becomes fixed in the public mind, shaping the
public's notion of the norm. Kelley and Beyler have countered those who
maintain that the cost of tort liability in malpractice and product liability, in-
cluding large awards, is modest when passed on to the public. While con-
ceding that insurance costs as a percent of expenditures for health care is a
modest 0.60,46, they demonstrate the uneven impact of insurance costs. 62 Fear
of current tendencies toward broader liability and larger damages may be
some corpo:rate defendants' and insurers' greatest concern, rather than the
present amount they spend on defending and paying large claims.63 As in
most market functionings, the focus is on the future.
Somebody, it seems, is always winning millions in lotteries following a
public stampede to buy tickets before a big drawing. Likewise, the public is
repeatedly being informed, correctly, that someone is being sued for millions
and that someone has won a multimillion-dollar verdict. Are multimillion-
dollar lottery winnings and tort recoveries even today statistically so im-
probable that they can be dismissed as unimportant? One suspects that the
multimillion-dollar lottery drawing stimulates lottery ticket sales generally,
just as reports in the media of large claims and large awards to plaintiffs pro-
bably have a generally elevating effect on jury verdicts and settlements whatever
the size of the claim. There may be no feasible method of establishing the
truth of this proposition; though it may need no demonstration.
Even now compensable injuries occupy only parts of the vast terrain where
arrows of severe misfortune strike. Does the notion that someone must be
responsible for a person's loss or injury represent an ill-examined response,
like killing the messenger who bears bad tidings? Are the common law's
long-established restrictions on loss-shifting economically sound and
ultimately beneficial to the community when coordinated with other forms of
compensation? Or are expanding liabilities a pressure moving us toward an
accident compensation scheme more like workers' compensation than the
common law? The course of the common law and statute, as everyone
62. Kelley & Beyler, supra note 15, at 155.
63. Id. at 155.
Expar.dirg liability rules, an increased propensity to sue defendants in the com-
mercial general liability and medical malpractice lines, and skyrocketing awards at
the very top end have increased the frequency and average severity of claims in
those lines. These increases and the trend they have established point to per-
manently higher insurance rates and reduced coverage. Indeed, the trend is so





knows, has been to embrace more and more rights for the injured, exer-
cisable against ever-expanding categories of persons. Examples are suits for
sexual harassment and the recent epidemic of employees' lawsuits against a
manufacturer of the employer's equipment which injured the employee. But
have not broadened liabilities and larger recoveries widened the gap between
the well-compensated victim and the victim who receives little or nothing?
Under the current tort compensation system, even those human misfor-
tunes traceable to particular events involving other persons' actions require
greater compensation than can beprudently allocated from the community's
wealth. A victim's recovery must be coupled with enormous costs of ad-
judication and settlement, including cases in which the victim receives
nothing. Nor does it matter whether the party ultimately bearing the cost is a
governmental entity (which always bears some of the cost of judicial ad-
ministration), an insurer, a corporation, or a natural person, although there
are reasons in some cases to impose liability or primary liability on one type
of entity rather than another. Ultimately all costs are borne by individuals or
groups of individuals, or the entire community, composed of individuals. A
compensation system which spends $2.33 or more for every dollar paid to a
victim is disgracefully inefficient." Can it not be said that efficiency in com-
pensation systems is a vital part of total justice, that it is linked in practice to
Friedman's two superprinciples? The more flawed the compensation system,
the more inadequate the compensation for some deserving victim. Even an
efficient system of a rich country cannot compensate every victim of misfor-
tune in an amount we would give him if life were always fair.
Amounts consumed by compensation systems have increased each year as
a percent of expenditures. Today they are so great and so misspent that the
system inhibits socially desirable activity. Physicians, not daring to follow
their better judgment, act defensively to minimize exposure to liability for
malpractice, frequently incurring uneconomic costs for the patient as well as
omitting procedures that on balance should be undertaken for the probable
or merely possible benefit to the patient. Drug products whose benefits in the
aggregate exceed their risks are withdrawn by the manufacturer, who fears
product liability. Birth-control devices are removed from the market even
though there is no substantial evidence that they are a hazard to health. A
64. Id.
This large [tort compensation] system benefits deserving victims less than it
benefits the plaintiff and defense litigation industries. As a system for putting
money in the deserving victims' hands, the tort system is grossly inefficient. In ef-
fect, we have a "trickle down" system in which enormous sums enter at the top
and far smaller sums emerge at the bottom for deserving victims to share.
Id. at 141. Another scholar, Kalalik, concludes that in asbestos injury litigation, plaintiffs re-
ceived less than 39 percent of the total costs per victim. J. KALum, VARIAIoN r AsBE Tos LmcA-
TION COMPENSATION AND ExPENsE 89 (1984). Earlier studies of the allocation of the liability in-
surance premium dollar concluded that 44 cents got to automobile victims' pockets after paying
their attorneys, 28 cents to medical malpractice victims, and 37.5 cents to product liability vic-
tims. O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance for
Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REv. 501, 504-11 (1976).
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two-year-old ciid obtained a settlement of $1.5 million from the Chicago Park
District as the result of falling through an opening at the top of a playground
slide nine feet above the ground.65 The Park District thereafter set about
removing playground equipment from parks. School districts restrict student
field trips and athletic programs because of fear of catastrophic accidental in-
jury to students for which the school district would be liable. Liability in-
surance has become unaffordable or unavailable. Publicity given by the
media heightens the sense of crisis.
Professor Friedman would surely not dispute that some losses should not
be shifted unless the victim protects himself by insurance, as when one's
house is destroyed by a fire of unknown origin. Professor Conard made the
shrewd observation years ago that no one insures himself against pain and
suffering. Why then, he asks, should one be forced to buy such coverage for
the benefit of the third parties?" There is, however, a difference in pain
caused by someone else's "fault," which Professor Conard was willing to
overlook. Because resources for compensation of injuries that should be
compensable are finite, and inadequate if measured against the ideal, the com-
pensation system must be efficient and fair. Efficiency, an elusive goal in
compensation systems, demands that settlement costs be as low as possible;
fairness deraands that as few people as possible be undercompensated and
overcompensated. To restate the classic position, the burden and quantum of
compensation should be allocated so as to reduce accidental injuries to the
optimal level. Workers' compensation systems should furnish an incentive
for employers to reduce the cost of accidents to this level; so also in theory
does common law liability for negligence.
Liability Insurance: Cause or Cure?
The censurable practices of liability insurance companies may have ag-
gravated the present strains on the system. There comes to mind no neat way
to disprove the plaintiffs' bar's claim that the insurance industry is putting
up a squall to soak business enterprise, and ultimately the consumer, with
high premiums to generate high profits.61 However, the claim is inherently
65. Sorry, Your Policy is Cancelled, supra note 12, at 16, 24.
66. Conard, Insurance Rates and Regulation, 15 U. MICH. L. QUAD NoTES 14 (1970).
67. Robert Habush, president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America said, "Tort
reform is just whipping up hysteria by the insurance companies to get things they've always
wanted. They want to minimize their risk and increase their profits." The Tort Reform
Quagmire, Fojinas, Aug. 11, 1986, at 76, 79.
The current insurance crisis has prompted renewed and more vocal pleas for
"tort reform." But the popular causes so prominently identified in the media-the
so-called litigation explosion and impending bankruptcy of the tort system-are
cruel hoaxes. Analysis shows that there is no tort litigation explosion and that the
tort system is financially sound and fundamentally necessary to our democratic
society.
The real cause of the insurance crisis lies not in the tort system but rather in the
industry's own mismanagement and imprudent underwriting practices. What is




implausible because such a motive on the part of insurers seems inconsistent
with their epidemic cancellations of coverage. One would think insurance
companies would want to sell as much coverage as they can profitably write.
Profit does not necessarily make insurance too costly to be attractive to the
insured.
Insurers are blamed for scrambling for premium income during the early
1980s. Premiums were invested at high rates of interest then prevailing
without regard to the probable volume of future claims, which later bal-
looned to an amount substantially exceeding premiums paid and investment
income. Thereafter, insurers drastically increased premiums or canceled
liability coverage on types of risks that had proved unprofitable or that could
not be predicted. Since expanding liability of insureds creates unknowable
risks, insurers take no chances. Kelley and Beyler observe that:
Admittedly, some insurers may be overreacting to [the unpredict-
ability of liability and losses]. But the insurers' reasonable
response to any charge that makes tort law and insurance law
seem less predictable is to increase both the reserves they set aside
and the premiums they charge. In any field looking like it might
go the way the asbestos and pollution fields have gone, any pru-
dent insurer will limit coverage, switch to claims-made policies or
withdraw from the field.' 8
Arguments over levels of profit and loss of liability insurers will likely be in-
conclusive and futile. The earnings of successful plaintiff personal-injury
lawyers, on the other hand, can be substantiated well enough to support the
premise that many of them-those made super-rich by contingency fees-are
overcompensated. The free market has not operated in setting contingency
fees, the levels of which were recently criticized by Chief Justice Burger.6
9
Likewise, if the free market does not operate in liability insurance pricing
and if insurance companies engage in abusive practices, state regulatory
agencies should take corrective action.
Liability and casualty insurance has undergone great change in the last
decades, prior to which, by creating a fund from premiums paid by a large
number of insureds, it served as a shield against statistically unlikely losses,
especially catastrophic losses. Insurance costs have roughly paralleled health
care costs in taking an ever-increasing share of enterprises' and consumers'
dollars. When insurance was a modest add-on expense, a sharing of risks of
statistically improbable disasters, it had a different function from, for exam-
ple, much health insurance today, which is to a large extent the spreading of
routine health care costs. Such insurance may provide no protection from
medical disaster because of the insurance policy's low maximum coverage.
Stewart, The "Tort Reform" Hoax, 22 TRIAL 89 (July 1986). Kelley & Beyler, supra note 15, at
144, demonstrates that lower interest rates after 1984 can account only for a modest increase in
insurance premiums.
68. Kelley & Beyler, supra note 15, at 150.
69. N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1986, at A20, col. 5.
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One promising innovation is Professor O'Connell's insurance scheme now
operating in some public school systems nationwide. For a modest premium,
a school district can adequately protect its students financially from disaster
caused by athletic injury, including life-long benefits for incapacitation, but
free of delay, high settlement and adjudication costs, uncertainty, over-
compensation, and undercompensation-all the evils of the tort system. Such
insurance schemes, Professor O'Connell suggested years ago, can be adapted
to product liability, malpractice, and liability of health care facilities: the
consumer can buy and pay for the amount of protection he wants.1 0
Juries and Judges and the Media
Juries and trial judges may often be faulted for being overgenerous to
plaintiffs, whatever the merits of their claims. While fault may be too strong
a term to apply to the juror's bias, it may be appropriately applied to some
trial judge;. Some appellate judges incur a heavier blame for being too
deferential in letting stand trial courts' judgments on verdicts in favor of
plaintiffs when plaintiff's proof was insufficient, plaintiff's theory unsup-
portable, o:r the award excessive, and occasionally in reversing a trial court's
judgment in favor of defendant. So saying, I would surely be remiss in fail-
ing to note that juries and judges both of trial and appellate courts decide a
vast number of tort cases correctly even today.
Perhaps juries, as the voice of the countryside, are telling us that society
wants compensation because an accident injured the plaintiff and the defen-
dant "caused" it; that, as Professor Friedman says, there is an expectation
of compen;ation. But most of the public also wants large military expen-
ditures and generous social security benefits, but does not want to pay for
them with higher taxes. Politicians shroud from public view and understand-
ing the reality that government funds for projects the public wants must be
taken from people by taxes or by the politically more palatable means of in-
creasing the public debt. An evolution analogous to the expectation of com-
pensation has occurred in social security, which originated, or at least was
presented to the public, as but a supplement to an individual's savings pro-
gram for retirement. In 1984 social security benefits constituted more than 50
percent of the income of 62 percent of those over age sixy-five receiving such
benefits.7 '
Though recoveries are small by American standards, strict liability in auto
accident and many other accident cases has been the legal norm on the Conti-
nent for more than a half century. While something approaching strict liabil-
ity has been the de facto norm in the United States in auto accident cases,
ever broader liability has been the course of the law for decades in product
liability cases, in contrast with the slower course of product liability law on
the Continent. If the public wants liability as to all accidents and misfortunes
70. O'Connel supra note 5, at 914.




"caused" by another, such may well evolve as the law in some form of com-
pensation system since the pressure of popular preference is usually stronger
than positive law, and therefore typically influences evolution of positive legal
regimes and rules. What, then, of the claimant who accidentally injures
himself? Or the victims of nonoccupational disease?
In New Zealand a comprehensive scheme for compensation for accidental
personal injury and occupational disease has been in place for a decade. Such
a system can function only if it is limited to the elements of compensation
recognized in workers' compensation systems. Lavishly calculated damages
for pain and suffering, for future costs of health care, and extravagantly
measured future earnings cannot be accommodated. As the certainty of com-
pensation increases, the rationale for a tort action and for contingent fees
weakens except in the case of intentional or otherwise outrageous torts. It
cannot be assumed a New Zealand-type scheme would be economically feas-
ible or even desirable in the United States. The New Zealand experience, even
if judged successful, is not necessarily an indication, let alone an assurance,
that the New Zealand theory and practice is workable in such a pluralistic,
debt-burdened society as the United States." A universal accident compensa-
tion scheme was rejected even in Australia. 73
Media Coverage of Liability Insurance
Recently the media have concentrated on what they aptly call the insurance
crisis;7' for the moment the crisis has ended, but the problems remain.
7
1
While the media often mention factors that have caused insurance to become
unavailable or vastly more expensive, the focus is usually on the effects of
not having insurance: closed parks and swimming pools, especially in small
communities for which self-insurance is not a possibility; skyrocketing in-
surance costs for businesses, often combined with a sharply reduced
coverage; or operation of an enterprise, public or private, without liability in-
surance. These developments are frightening for any but the most ven-
turesome entrepreneur of a small or medium-sized business. Even a big
business can be wiped out by tort liability as was Johns-Manville for
asbestos-related illnesses, and as A. H. Robins may be for Dalkon Shield-
related injuries.
76
In the recent barrage of attention by the media, the plaintiffs' bar and the
judicial system have not frequently been subjected to criticism by the media.
72. Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CALIF. L.
REv. 976 (1985).
73. See Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: The First Two Years, 25 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 1 (1977).
74. See, e.g., Sorry, Your Policy is Cancelled, supra note 12; Business Struggling To Adapt
as Insurance Crisis Spreads, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 37, col. 1; The Insurance Squeeze, St.
L. Post Dispatch, Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. I (series).
75. Liability Rates Flattening Out as Crisis Eases, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1987, § 1, at 1.
76. See Couric, The A.H. Robins Saga, 72 A.B.A. J. 56 (1986).
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However, the viewer or reader is often left with the impression that insurance
companies are not playing fair and that the government should step in.7"
Such was the case in May 1986, when all insurance companies writing
medical malpractice insurance in West Virginia announced they would no
longer offer coverage in that state. The linkage of increased insurance costs
with increased numbers of claims and larger settlements, reflecting ultimately
the disposition of cases by appellate courts, is not sufficiently emphasized to
have impact on many viewers. The public, which includes jurors, will in time
come to understand the links between the individual's pocketbook, insurance
costs, and compensation for injuries. The public will understand that
overgenerous awards, even against large corporations, are passed on in
higher prices, just as in motor accident cases it is common belief that jurors
know, though they are not told by the court, that it is the defendant's in-
surance company which will bear the verdict for the plaintiff. Today many
juries may realize that the size of verdicts for plaintiffs in auto accident
cases, having impact on the size of settlements, affects the cost of liability in-
surance bought by the motoring public. In automobile cases the linkage is
much clearer than, for example, in a product liability case in which no juror
makes frequent use of the type of product manufactured by the defendant.
The realization by the public that damage awards are passed on by the cor-
porate defendant seems especially important in the realm of punitive
damages, for which liability insurance is not available in some states because
of public policy. The plaintiff is permitted to show the large corporate defen-
dant's wealth of billions of dollars without mention of the reality that such a
defendant's exposure to liability may be a thousand times that of a small
business with .1/1000th the assets. This is an unsound extension of the law of
punitive damages as it relates to natural persons. In cases in which a corpora-
tion's liability is vicarious in the sense that the censurably acting employees
are not the higher management, whose acts may be assimilated to the acts of
the corporation itself, it is doubtful that punitive damages should ever be
awarded.
A recent example of the probable result of showing a corporate
defendant's wealth was a judgment entered by a United States District Court
in Colorado on a verdict of $19 million against Sears, Roebuck in favor of a
dismissed store manager whom the jury found to have been discriminated
against because of age in violation of Colorado law.78 Upholding the verdict,
including $5 million for pain, suffering, and humiliation, and $10 million for
exemplary damages, Judge Kane said, "I am simply not imperious enough to
77. Kelley & Beyler, supra note 15, at 155:
Perhaps the best evidence of the social impact of higher insurance rates are the
reports of individual cases we read in newspapers and magazines. These social ef-
fects explain why people are upset by the insurance crisis. They don't like the
higher prices for some important goods and services. They don't like the limits on
their freedom of choice imposed by producers and providers getting out of certain
areas. They don't like to see small businesses disadvantaged.




say that this jury did not know what it was doing.... On the basis of con-
flicting and sometimes unexplained evidence, this jury found in favor of an
individual and against a vast corporate enterprise.""' But imperiousness bet-
ter describes the actual disposition of the case: is it not imperious for a judge
in effect to command members of the public, Sears customers, to buy a lot-
tery ticket that will make some lucky (or unlucky) person super-rich? Beyond
that, common sense shouts to us that, whatever the blameworthiness of
Sears, $19 million is far too much.80
Media as a Force for Excessive Liabilities
Under a tort system, costs of some injuries should not be shifted to a party
involved in the occurrence causing injury because to do so is to induce
uneconomic costs of prevention, a premise seldom treated by the media. The
premise is thus not evident to many jurors conditioned by the media to large
awards who see themselves, as most members of the public do, as potential
plaintiffs rather than defendants.
The fact of the accident is tending more and more to permit an inference
of the insufficiency of the defendant's provision for the plaintiff's safety; res
ipsa gone mad. If, however, the plaintiff was assaulted after dark in the
defendant supermarket's parking lot when the lighting system was not func-
tioning properly, there may be no difficulty in finding negligence and that
lack of adequate lighting was the proximate cause of the assault. Virtually all
supermarket customers are willing to share the cost of dependable lighting in
the parking lot, an efficient, cheap deterrent to assault, accidents, and car
theft. Causation is much in doubt, however, in an action against the
manufacturer of a power lawnmower in which plaintiff, the user, alleges he
suffered a heart attack as a result of being required to pull too hard on the
cord to start the machine. Unless there is a fair preponderance of evidence
that the machine was negligently designed, there is no causal link.
79. Id. at 1553.
80. Does Judge Weinfeld sound imperious in Brink's, Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F.
Supp. 403, 414 (1982), when he granted defendant Brink's, Inc., a new trial unless plaintiff, the
City of New York, agreed to a reduction of punitive damages from $5 million to $1.5 million in
a case involving the city's claim for loss of parking meter revenue through dishonesty of Brink's
employees of which Brink's executives had knowledge? He said:
This was not a case of products liability involving an injurious or poisonous drug.
that has been widely distributed, or a vehicle with a dangerously defective
mechanism that has been installed in thousands of cars with their potentiality for
death or lifetime crippling effects; nor is it a libel suit reflecting elements of per-
sonal ill will or hostility and ofttimes with the prospect of repetition as a part of a
business policy or fraudulent conduct. In such instances there is justification for
imposition of substantial punitive damage awards. Here in contrast, the immediate
impact of wrongful conduct was upon the City ... and there is little prospect that
repetitive conduct will occur and injure others .... The resulting injury, assuming
repetitive conduct, is to property-the loss of money, not death or severe personal
injury.
If an essential purpose of punitive damages is its deterrent force, these are fac-
tors that may properly be considered in assessing the amount of the fine.
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True it is that when an accident injures me, I am no longer able to view it
objectively; there swells within me an urge for vengeance. "Justice" requires
compensation because my injury, my festering loss, was not my "fault." It
must, it may seem to follow, be someone else's fault. The "someone else"
should be made to pay. Further, says columnist Ellen Goodman, "We are
less accepting today of accidents, frailties, even 'acts of God,' because we de-
pend less on nature and more on technology."81 According to a recent survey
by Professor Susan Sibley, a sociologist,82 plaintiffs typically stated that they
were not concerned with recovery of money, but rather with what they viewed
as vindication of principle in making defendants pay. This expressed mo-
tivation fo.r litigation is suspect, and in fact it seems that vindication of
principle and monetary recovery are at least at a subconscious level firmly
bonded in most plaintiffs' minds. Talk is cheap; it is easy for a plaintiff to
say his interest is only in principle even when monetary recovery is his main
concern. Only if plaintiff donates any recovery in excess of out-of-pocket
loss and expenses to charity need we take seriously his talk of principle as his
only interest.
The plaintiffs' bar is quick to assert a practical justification for principle,
that public good flows from successful personal injury claims, which result in
making products, premises, and the environment safer. It does not address
the question of whether such improvements may be purchased at too high a
price. In some cases, such as an excessively stringent liability on land oc-
cupiers to protect invitees from personal injury or theft perpetrated by
trespassers, imposition of liability operates merely to shift the identity of vic-
tims from one group of persons to another and, thus, does not operate as a
deterrent to wrongdoing for society as a whole.
If the lawnmower-heart attack victim's suit comes to trial, plaintiff will
likely produce as an expert witness a physician who will testify that the stress
of pulling the cord to start the machine could bring on a heart attack; an
engineer will testify that the machine was not designed to start as easily as it
could have been. Such now-perfunctory testimony should, one may well
argue, be insufficient to get to the jury. The causal link has not been suffi-
ciently established. To impose liability is to add unjustifiably to the price of
the lawnmower.
In a more unusual case, the plaintiff's daughter was shot and killed by her
New York state trooper boyfriend, who then committed suicide. The plaintiff
sued the state of New York, claiming insufficient screening in making a
determination as to whether an applicant was sufficiently emotionally stable
to be issued firearms.' 3 Again, the plaintiff can undoubtedly marshal some
evidence which, she urges, tends to show that procedures were insufficient,
and some evidence that the wrongdoer would have been found unsuitable to
81. Goodman, Not What They Bargained For, St. L. Post Dispatch, Oct. 18, 1985, at 7G,
Col. 1.
82. Sibley, Seeking Justice, Wall St. J., May 20, 1986, at 18, col. 2.




be issued a gun if proper procedures had been followed. Fairly appraised, the
evidence may not show negligence; after the fact, it is always possible to
point to things the defendant could and, therefore, should have done which
might have averted the harm.
Less unusual are cases against psychotherapists brought by relatives of pa-
tients who become violent. In a Michigan case," which is in the process of
becoming a cause celebre on appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, the
court of appeals affirmed a jury award of $500,000 for the plaintiff whose
sister had been shot to death in a scuffle with her son (the patient and the
plaintiffs nephew). The nephew had sought and obtained release from a
mental hospital he had voluntarily entered two weeks previously. The defen-
dant psychiatrist approved the release, believing the patient had no history
predictive of violent behavior (prediction of violent behavior is often im-
possible). The jury was permitted to find the defendant failed to exercise
reasonable professional skill in permitting the release of the patient. The
testimony of plaintiff's psychiatrist witness was held to support a finding that
the patient's history foretold substantial risk of some sort of violent behavior
to a psychiatrist exercising reasonable professional skill and called for a
warning to the patient's mother, the victim of the shooting. In the era of the
professional medical expert witness, that such testimony could be adduced is
not surprising.
If the trial judge errs in sending such cases to the jury, it is up to the ap-
pellate court to reverse verdicts in favor of the plaintiff, who has failed to
make a prima facie case. Every week this takes more mettle, as the at-
mosphere becomes intoxicated by the heady wine of a remedy for every in-
jury. Starting the lawmnower was merely the occasion, the immediate induce-
ment, not the cause or a cause, in the legal sense, of the heart attack. To im-
pose liability is like holding a physician liable for any negative results of his
treatment, or an attorney liable for malpractice because he lost his client's
case. A milestone may have been reached when a jury awarded $10 million in
compensatory and punitive damages to a plaintiff who claimed he was
stricken by a heart attack as a result of an antitrust suit maliciously brought
against him by the defendant.8" It is hardly surprising that the media report
these exotic cases, which in turn engender more such cases as potential plain-
tiffs are conditioned by them.
The trial judge sits as a thirteenth juror, it is said. He should be bolder in
ruling that plaintiff's proof is insufficient to get to the jury even though this
is made more difficult by reason of the public's conditioning by the media.
The "safe" course, however, is to submit the case to the jury, and then if a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff survives appeal, that is the end of the matter,
whereas if the trial judge is reversed after having withheld the case from the
jury, there must be a new trial. The trial judge is no doubt more popular
84. Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich. App. 291, 335 N.W.2d 481 (1983); More Psychotherapists
Held Liable for the Actions of Violent Patients, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1987, at 31, col. 5.
85. L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
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following this easier course, even when his personal view is strong that the
plaintiff has not made a prima facie case. Maybe the jury will find for defen-
dant; maybe the parties will settle. It has proved unrealistic to expect a trial
judge to resist the trend to favor plaintiffs. He or she feels pressure from the
plaintiffs' bar and pressure generated by reports of recoveries for injuries in
the media, which, in conditioning public expectations, have conditioned
jurors. Often the trial judge is looking toward reelection. As the trend to
favor plaintiffs gains momentum, the harder it becomes to buck. The judge
who does so is a pariah facing the wrath and political power of a wealthy
plaintiffs' bar. Gone are the days when the county judge ranked just below
God in the community and suffered no doubts about his authoritative image.
Appellate judges and all federal judges are different from state trial
judges. The former have power. Unlike most state trial judges, they are not,
or need not be, subject to political pressure. While it may be an unrealistic
expectation of many state trial judges, state appellate and federal judges
must have the courage to be unpopular with the plaintiffs' bar, to be called
brutal and inhuman by it, its disappointed clients, and the formidable
organizations and institutions, most notably legislatures, upon which the
plaintiffs' bar has influence. A judge may, of course, be free of or imper-
vious to political pressure of the plaintiffs' bar and of media, but be intellec-
tually satisfied that jury determinations that some of his brethren consider
unsupportably favorable to plaintiffs should be allowed to stand. He or she
may, for example, view compensation systems primarily as vehicles for loss-
spreading or for redistribution of wealth, or he may believe, like Judge Kane,
that jury determinations are to be respected within broadest limits. Case by
case, it is fimrossible to demonstrate that costs of prevention imposed on
those whose activity creates risks similar to those of this particular defendant
would exceed the reasonably measured costs of harms thereby prevented. It is
only when the radiations of more extensive liability are felt in insurance
costs, unavailability of insurance, and curtailed activities that an imbalance
becomes apparent.
Personal injury law will continue to need the fine tuning of case law even if
much tort law is displaced by a comprehensive, formulaic compensation
system, which the media would probably ignore. Workers' compensation
cases continue to generate much appellate litigation which serves to illustrate
that legislated formulae -for compensation of personal injuries would in-
evitably produce occasional inequitable results and will require continuing
surveillance by courts and legislatures.
Conclusion
Intuitively one suspects that all misfortunes that should, in a richer,
peaceful world be subject to compensation by the legal system, exceed the
amount of money that society can optimally spend on compensation of vic-
tims. If the compensation system is out of control, its excesses bear the seeds
of its cure. The system will in time be corrected. Babies will continue to be




medicine. Swimming pools may close and high school field trips may be
suspended for a time. At some point there will come general realization that
these activities are essential, though they, like most human activity, cannot
be made risk-free. The common law set out to reach equilibrium between the
cost of accidents, realistically assessed, and the cost of prevention. Some way
an equilibrium will be restored.
In May 1986, a United States court of appeals overturned a widely publi-
cized district court judgment of $1.2 million in favor of widows of fishermen
suing under the Suits in Admiralty Act, the fishermen having been lost at sea
because of a negligently made weather forecast of the National Atmospheric
and Weather Service.86 In addition, there are scores of lung cancer cases,
some highly publicized, but none to date in which liability has been imposed
on a cigarette manufacturer.8 7 Lawsuits against churches and clergy seeking
to impose liability for counseling or lack of counseling allegedly resulting in
tragedy such as plaintiff's child's suicide received attention from the media, 8
to date no such case has gone to a jury. Is it possible that the plaintiffs' bar is
overplaying its hand, thereby hastening a reaction that will bring basic
changes in the scope and operation of the common law tort system of the
United States?
Erring appellate courts sooner or later will see the fallacy of responding to
pressures of the plaintiffs' bar and of public opinion generated by the media,
and of trying to remake life into a riskless affair by expanding tort liability.
Excessive and improper awards are not only harmful to the economy but
harmful in that they result ultimately in denying adequate compensation to
some injured person who has a good claim and who needs the money.
86. Brown v. United States, 790 F.2d 199 (Ist Cir. 1986).
87. See, e.g., cases cited at 14 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rptr. (BNA) 25 (1985).
88. See Clergy Malpractice-The Prayer for Relief, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 4, 1985, at 1; Christian
Sci. Monitor, June 13, 1985, (Ideas), at 25.
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